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Samir Gandesha, ed. Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and International 
Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 2020). – xii, 291 pages. – isbn 9780745340630.
Lawrence Grossberg, Under the Cover of Chaos: Trump and the Battle for the American 
Right (London: Pluto Press, 2018). – xv, 165 pages. – isbn 9780745337920.
David Renton, The New Authoritarians: Convergence on the Right (London: Pluto 
Press, 2019). – 280 pages. – isbn 9780745338170.
David Renton, Fascism: History and Theory (revised edition of Fascism: Theory and 
Practice, 1999) (London: Pluto Press, 2020). – 192 pages. – isbn 9780745341194.
Mike Wendling, Alt Right: From 4 Chan to the White House (London: Pluto Press, 
2018). – vi, 294 pages. – isbn 9780745337951.
The titles listed above are all published by the London-based Pluto Press, a 
radical anti-capitalist, internationalist and politically independent publisher. 
Originally founded in 1969, Pluto Press is one of Britain’s oldest radical-left pub-
lishers. Over fifty years on, their concern is to remain relevant, not to hark back to 
the past of 1960s radical protest, but to make timely interventions in the present. 
Nonetheless, past struggles remain a major source of inspiration for the publisher: 
‘fascism and racism are on the rise. Refugees are fleeing authoritarian regimes 
and war. Tensions between corporations and workers are increasing, fuelled by 
austerity policies and deepening inequality. The world needs a Left Book Club 
for the 21st Century’, Pluto’s Managing Director declared in 2018.1 Without doubt, 
1 Kit Caless, ‘Inside the UK’s Most Radical Indie Publishers,’ Huck, June 6, 2018, accessed 
February 12, 2021, https://www.huckmag.com/art-and-culture/books-art-and-culture/
inside-uks-radical-indie-publishers/.
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the publication of these five titles constitute a timely intervention. Collectively, 
they merit review as a sample, or ‘taster’ of how the radical left currently views 
fascism and the resurgent right. But the timing of this intervention aside, do they 
hold any special significance for the academic analysis of fascism today? For ‘At 
this moment’, as David Renton concedes in Fascism: History and Theory, ‘there 
is hardly any theory which is less fashionable among historians of fascism than 
Marxism’ (p. 45).
The first title, Samir Gandesha’s edited volume, Spectres of Fascism, is the 
outcome of a free school hosted by the Institute for the Humanities at British 
Columbia’s Simon Fraser University in 2017. The context for it, of course, is all 
too familiar: the continued electoral successes of radical right-wing populism 
in Europe and beyond; Brexit; and the November 2016 election of Donald J. 
Trump as forty-fifth President of the United States. This temporal context has 
attracted a variety of epithets from ‘post-fascism’, ‘late-fascism’ to ‘fascist creep’ 
(the notion of ‘creep’ calling attention to a worrying process of convergence 
between the conservative and the far right, see Renton, below). However, 
Gandesha opts for a different term altogether: ‘spectres of fascism’, that is to 
say, phantom-like forms of fascism that haunt us in the present day.
Gandesha, a Marxist (and someone who is particularly taken by Bonapartist 
theory), posits that the problem with ideological readings of fascism as an 
ultra-nationalist, revolutionary response to an existential crisis of meaning 
is that these readings fail to understand fascism ‘within a class analysis sit-
uated within a larger understanding of the socioeconomic crisis of capital-
ism’(p. 7). How then does Gandesha navigate working-class support for the far 
right when fascism is supposedly the bourgeoisie’s response to working-class 
hostility to capitalism? According to Gandesha, interwar Western Marxists, 
in particular Georg Lukás and the Frankfurt School, did fully understand the 
‘subjective dimensions of the crisis that made the working class susceptible to 
the siren song of fascism’ (p. 7). Fascists used imperialism, displacing class with 
national identity, to garner the support of the ‘lower petite bourgeoisie and the 
Lumpenproletariat, or those classes whose social precarity renders them par-
ticularly insecure and susceptible to xenophobia and extreme forms of nation-
alism within the context of an imperialist project’ (p. 8).
But what of today’s ‘spectres of fascism’? If twentieth-century fascism 
offered a solution to economic crisis by accelerating surplus-value extraction 
through imperialism and the destruction of working-class institutions; in the 
twenty-first century, fascism returns as the ‘authoritarian populist translation 
of economic insecurities into cultural anxieties against the backdrop of the 
prospect of ecological collapse’ (p. 13). This is not an anti-working-class alli-
ance between industrial capital and the petite bourgeoisie in the context of 
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imperialist rivalries and capitalist crises of overproduction, as in ‘classic fas-
cism’, but now, after neo-liberalism’s defeat of organised labour, twenty-first 
century fascism directs its appeal to neo-liberalism’s ‘abandoned subjects’, 
those confronted with inequality, austerity, insecurity, global migration flows, 
and global climate change.
There is much to muse on here, and we are offered the tantalising prospect 
of a thoroughly interdisciplinary volume that delivers a conceptual framework 
for understanding these ‘spectres of fascism’. This collection is eclectic, draw-
ing from art history, communications, philosophy, political economy, political 
science, psychoanalysis and sociology. The geographical span is also exten-
sive, covering Europe, North America, Latin America, and India. There are 
moments of genuine insight in this text, and readers can decide for themselves 
on the chapters that speak most to their interests. However, the overarching 
limitation with this book is that it lacks a sustained focus on contemporary 
developments. Too many chapters simply do not engage with ‘post-fascism’ 
and there is no overarching conclusion that distils a conceptual framework 
from each multifaceted account. As a result, the volume struggles to add up to 
much more than the sum of its parts.
While Spectres of Fascism is global in its reach, Lawrence Grossberg’s Under 
the Cover of Chaos: Trump and the Battle of the American Right is particularist. 
For those us who subscribe to the notion that that fascism should be generi-
cised, the tone of Grossberg’s opening comments do not augur well, ‘we should 
resist the all-too-common temptation to start by assimilating the specific to 
the general, making Trump into the U.S. version of something that is happen-
ing in many parts of the world. . . . These are often described as formations of 
demagoguery, authoritarian populism, neo-fascism, or illiberal democracy . . . 
it is more productive to start by examining the specificity of the contemporary 
U.S. context’ (pp. 4–5).
According to Grossberg, Trumpism is best understood as a hybrid form 
of conservatism that originates from two native conservative traditions: 
the first is the neo-liberal New Right, the second is the populist reactionary 
conservatism of the Tea Parties. Where does the ‘alt-right’ feature in all this? 
In Grossberg’s reading, the ‘alt-right’ constitutes the extremist wing of the 
reactionary conservative tradition. Two main factions define the ‘alt-right’: 
Yiannopoulus-style ‘post-libertarians’ (tech-savvy, subversive hactivists and 
trollers); and those, such as Richard Spencer, who are or come ‘very close to 
neo-fascism, most clearly in the forms of white supremacism and anti-Sem-
itism’ (p. 76). What defines Trumpism, then, is a particular configuration 
of US conservatism that combines nationalism with popular sovereignty 
(populism).
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As a cultural studies scholar, Grossberg’s methodology is heavily indebted 
to conjunctural analysis (a multidimensional context whereby historical, 
political, economic and affective dimensions intersect and make possible a 
cultural war of positions). The present conjuncture in the US is ‘reactionary 
counter-modernity’, where the nation has been reduced to the affective land-
scape of identity, and what defines the ‘white’ nation is corporate culture with 
Trump its symbolic figurehead. This not the totalitarian fascism of the 1930s, 
but an ‘alt-fascism’ where the corporation becomes the nation and the state 
(p. 140). ‘Alt-fascism’ is, for Grossberg, cultural nationalism governed by popular 
corporatocracy. It is therefore incumbent on socialists to expose the paradox 
in people’s continued trust in corporations despite their history of corruption 
and failure; and to re-imagine a state and democratic political culture freed 
from the grip of corporate capitalism.
This book, engaging as it is, makes for a provocative response to Trumpism. 
However, for scholars of ‘fascism studies’, there is little that pushes the concep-
tual field forward (although his stimulating chapter on affective landscapes 
certainly grabbed my attention). The notion of ‘alt-fascism’ (the prefix ‘alt’ 
denoting rebellion against tradition while remaining essentially part of it) still 
locates fascism in the reactionary conservative right, rehearsing a standard 
Marxist position.
This brings me to bbc journalist Mike Wendling’s Alt-Right: From 4chan to 
the White House. Narrower in focus, this book is aimed at those who want to 
get a handle on a movement that rose to prominence during Trump’s 2016 
election campaign. Its purpose is to ‘define, demystify and declaw the alt-
right, to find out where the movement came from and where it might be going’ 
(p. 16). Published in 2018, and now bettered by more recent publications (such 
as the volume by Patrik Hermansson et. al, which locates the ‘alt-right’ in a wider 
international perspective), Wendling’s account is US-centric and aimed more 
at the general reader than the specialist. He breaks the ‘alt-right’ down into the 
now familiar groupings of the ‘alt-light’ and the harder white ethno-nationalist 
core. ‘The alt-light plays down the extremists; the hard core uses the relatively 
more attractive and “moderate” wing to draw people further towards its side’ 
(p. 12). This makes for an interesting case study of the connections between 
the radical conservative right and the extreme right. What Wendling reveals is 
that this relationship has always been uneasy, contradictory, and from the time 
of Trump’s inauguration, the cause of intra-movement conflict. For Wendling, 
this conflict represents both the primacy of the ‘alt-right’s’ more extreme 
elements (white ethno-nationalists, conspiracy theorists, and neo-Nazis) 
and the cause of its unravelling.
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This is not a theoretical-conceptual exposition; there is no attempt to locate 
the ‘alt-right’ within the structures of contemporary capitalism. In fact, Wendling 
is even critical of radical-left antifa protest as ‘often counter-productive’  
(p. 221). As for responses, Wendling’s suggestion is hardly revolutionary: the 
most likely scenario is that this ‘Frankenstein of a political group will continue 
to fall apart, with energetic elements shooting off in all sorts of directions’  
(p. 223). In the meantime, the left should rediscover humour and poke fun at 
the ‘alt-right’: ‘For all its genuine rage, the alt-right’s broad appeal was built 
around humor, irony and mockery – and they’re not the only team that can 
play that game’ (p. 222).
Radical historian David Renton will be a familiar name to students of 
generic fascism (see Renton’s contribution to the debate on Trump and fas-
cism in this volume). Following a flurry of publications at the end of the 1990s/
early noughties – including a co-edited volume with the author of this review – 
Renton left academia to pursue a career as a barrister. Although still working in 
the legal profession, he has made a welcome return to publishing fray over the 
last few years. In 2019 he published The New Authoritarians with Pluto Press, 
and in 2020, Pluto Press published a new and updated edition of his Fascism: 
Theory and Practice as Fascism: History and Theory as its companion volume.
Renton opens The New Authoritarians by declaring that ‘The right has 
changed: it has embraced the ideas of its outliers’ (p.1.). Indebted to the work of 
the late Scottish Marxist historian Neil Davidson, Renton distinguishes between 
three right-wing traditions which can be conceptualised by how far they are 
willing to go to defend capitalism. For conservatives, the best way to defend 
capitalism is through the maintenance of existing social relationships; for the 
non-fascist far right, it is about restoring lost relationships; and for fascists it 
requires a counter-revolution to purge the nation of its enemies. So, for Renton, 
fascism is a specific form of reactionary mass movement that seeks to ‘advance 
capitalist technology while restoring society to the class peace it wrongly 
associates with the years prior to 1789’ (p. 16). Meanwhile, the ‘non-fascist’ 
far right, which we might otherwise define as radical right-wing populism, 
seeks power democratically, retains a long-term commitment to electoral pol-
itics, does not worship the state, and does not seek to transcend class. Where 
Renton differs from Davidson, however, is in his insistence that boundaries are 
not fixed in ‘ideal-types’, but move: ‘What happens when the boundaries move 
and the component parts of the right are reordered? What happens when parts 
of the right, which are usually distinct and hostile, begin to co-operate? What 
kinds of left-wing strategy will be most effective against today’s aggressive and 
authoritarian but non-fascist right?’ (p. 19).
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Renton’s thesis is that in the period 2016–17, conservatives increasingly con-
verged with the non-fascist far right. In part, this was a consequence of two 
key long-term dynamics: the legacy of September 11 having diminished the 
collective memory of 1939–45, and the ways in which postwar far right rein-
vented itself, breaking free from its fascist predecessors. The more immediate 
catalysts behind convergence were the demise of welfare spending (austerity) 
after the economic crash of 2007–8, and the declining legitimacy of globalised 
free trade.
So where does this leave twenty-first century fascism? For the moment, it 
has been rejected by the far right. But this might change, Renton warns. The 
structural weakness of the non-fascist far right is that it is ideologically vague 
(anti-Muslim racism is no substitute for anti-Jewish racism when it comes 
to explaining the 2008 crash; anti-socialism has been replaced by antipathy 
towards social liberalism). ‘This is why fascism may yet return; because unlike 
the non-fascist far right, fascism has a clear goal’ and since Renton predicts fur-
ther economic crisis ahead, ‘the supporters of the right will increasingly need 
one’ (p. 225).
The solution to defeating convergence on the right, Renton argues, is for the 
left to a) expose the racism and discrimination that underpins the convergence 
of right and far right; b) to break the alliance between the right’s parliamen-
tary politics and the far-right’s street politics by exposing the incompatibility 
between the two; c) to defend itself through popular protest; d) to provide a 
real alternative by being serious about wealth redistribution and having the 
credibility to win office; and e) by challenging all forms of oppression, not 
only in rejecting neo-liberalism but also in rejecting misogyny and racism. As 
Renton puts it, ‘The way to defeat the right is for the left to offer more, better 
wages, cheaper homes, greater benefits, as well as sustained hostility to the 
racism and sexism and other ideas of the right. The left needs to go through its 
own process of reconstruction and renewal’ (p. 22). It is hard to disagree with 
Renton that the left needs to renew itself, and The New Authoritarians does 
make a strong case for rejecting any return to a Blairite ‘Third Way’. But what 
of the left’s response to ecological crisis? Renton does not touch upon this 
(cf. Gandeshi, above) but this must surely factor in its renewal too?
Renton’s Fascism: History and Theory offers a very accessible and engaging 
exploration of the Marxist theory of fascism through three sub-theories: the 
‘left’ theory (fascism as an elite movement, the puppet of the capitalist rul-
ing class); ‘right’ theory (fascism as a mass movement autonomous of capital 
control); and a ‘dialectical’ theory (a combination of the ‘right’ and ‘left’ the-
ories, which understands fascism in terms of the contradiction between the 
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radical demands of its mass base, and the reality of power where fascism sides 
with capital). Renton argues that this third theory ‘reached a more accurate 
appreciation of fascism, not just than other Marxists but than anyone else in 
the interwar years’ (p. 5). It was the contradiction at the very heart of fascism, 
Renton says, that was source of fascism’s ‘spectacular success, its hubris and 
ultimately its doom’ (p. 159). For Renton, then, fascism is a specific form of reac-
tionary mass movement.
Renton remains as critical as ever of those who subscribe to ‘New Consensus’ 
school (although he fails to mention that this term is now rather passé). He 
once again revisits his long-held argument that fascism is not simply a set of 
ideas; that the defining feature of fascism was the combination of reactionary 
goals and an aspiration to build a mass movement; that its distinguishing fea-
tures relate to fascism’s style, and to one distinguishing feature in particular, 
the use of violence; and that the role of the historian of fascism is to be critical 
towards fascism (rather than simply viewing fascism through the views of the 
fascists themselves). ‘Those who adopt the New Consensus remain trapped for-
ever looking at the past only through the eyes of the intellectuals who shilled 
for fascism. Their approach prevents them for ever seeing fascism through the 
eyes of its victims’ (p. 38). As a historian of fascism and anti-fascism, who finds 
an ideological reading of fascism more compelling than a Marxist one, I must be 
the exception then because I am capable of viewing fascism from the perspec-
tive of anti-fascists. The idea that non-Marxist historians of fascism are blind 
to the suffering of its victims is a tad offensive (a jibe that probably reflects 
Renton’s third vocation, that of seasoned anti-fascist activist).
In the end, we need to ask: does Renton’s revised edition make more of a 
contribution than the first? It still provides an excellent introduction to the 
Marxist theory of fascism – this text should be first port of call for students 
wishing to understand its various nuances. It has been updated, incorpo-
rating reference to much literature that has been published since the first 
edition; it has also removed much of the material on the revival of fascism 
after 1945 which is an area better explored in The New Authoritarians. Taken 
together, these two books do make for a valuable contribution, demonstrating 
the extent to which the radical left has become more open to nuanced per-
spectives, especially regarding the ‘non-fascist’ reactionary right (Renton, for 
example, accepts that Franco’s regime was not fascist, p. 143). Yet, at the same 
time, they reveal a dogged refusal to cut the Gordian Knot – the impossibly 
tangled knot – that still binds to the Marxist method whereby fascism must be 
understood through its relationship to class and capital (fascism exists to solve 
the problem of working-class hostility to capitalism). For Renton, then, the 
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essential character of fascism is reactionary (fascism as the antithesis of ‘pro-
gress’ whereby ‘progress’ is defined in Marxist terms as increasing equality and 
the abolition of capitalism). But in the end, it is this basic ideological premise 
– that fascism can never be genuinely revolutionary – that needs to change for 
the radical left to enrich the field of comparative fascist studies any further.
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